THE OCCASION AND PURPOSE OF THIS "MANUAL
1. I cannot say, my dearest son
Laurence, how much your learning pleases me, and how much I desire that you
should be wise -- though not one of those of whom it is said: "Where is
the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputant of this world? Hath not
God made foolish the wisdom of this world?" (1Cor. 1:20.)
Rather, you should be one of those of whom it is written, "The multitude
of the wise is the health of the world" (Wis. 6:26
(Vulgate).); and also you should be the kind of man the apostle wishes those
men to be to whom he said, (Rom. 16:19.)
"I would have you be wise in goodness and simple in evil." (A later
interpolation, not found in the best MSS., adds, "As no one can exist from
himself, so also no one can be wise in himself save only as he is enlightened
by Him of whom it is written, 'All wisdom is from God' [Ecclus. 1:1].")
2. Human wisdom consists in piety. This you have in the book of the saintly Job, for there he writes that Wisdom herself said to man, "Behold, piety is wisdom." (Job 28:28.) If, then, you ask what kind of piety she was speaking of, you will find it more distinctly designated by the Greek term qeosebeia, literally, "the service of God." The Greek has still another word for "piety," ensebeia, which also signifies "proper service." This too refers chiefly to the service of God. But no term is better than qeosebeia, which clearly expresses the idea of the man's service of God as the source of human wisdom.
When you ask me to be brief, you do not expect me to speak of great issues in a few sentences, do you? Is not this rather what you desire: a brief summary or a short treatise on the proper mode of worshipping [serving] God?
3. If I should answer, "God should be worshipped in faith, hope, love," you would doubtless reply that this was shorter than you wished, and might then beg for a brief explication of what each of these three means: What should be believed, what should be hoped for, and what should be loved? If I should answer these questions, you would then have everything you asked for in your letter. If you have kept a copy of it, you can easily refer to it. If not, recall your questions as I discuss them.
4. It is your desire, as you wrote, to have from me a book, a sort of enchiridion, (A transliteration of the Greek, literally, a handbook or manual.) as it might be called -- something to have "at hand" -- that deals with your questions. What is to be sought after above all else? What, in view of the divers heresies, is to be avoided above all else? How far does reason support religion; or what happens to reason when the issues involved concern faith alone; what is the beginning and end of our endeavor? What is the most comprehensive of all explanations? What is the certain and distinctive foundation of the catholic faith? You would have the answers to all these questions if you really understood what a man should believe, what he should hope for, and what he ought to love. For these are the chief things -- indeed, the only things -- to seek for in religion. He who turns away from them is either a complete stranger to the name of Christ or else he is a heretic. Things that arise in sensory experience, or that are analyzed by the intellect, may be demonstrated by the reason. But in matters that pass beyond the scope of the physical senses, which we have not settled by our own understanding, and cannot -- here we must believe, without hesitation, the witness of those men by whom the Scriptures (rightly called divine) were composed, men who were divinely aided in their senses and their minds to see and even to foresee the things about which they testify.
(Job 28:28.). But, as this faith, which works by love, (Cf. Gal. 5:6.) begins to penetrate the soul, it tends, through the vital power of goodness, to change into sight, so that the holy and perfect in heart catch glimpses of that ineffable beauty whose full vision is our highest happiness. Here, then, surely, is the answer to your question about the beginning and the end of our endeavor. We begin in faith, we are perfected in sight. (Cf. 1Cor. 13:10, 11.) This likewise is the most comprehensive of all explanations. As for the certain and distinctive foundation of the catholic faith, it is Christ. "For other foundation," said the apostle, "can no man lay save that which has been laid, which is Christ Jesus." (1Cor. 3:11.) Nor should it be denied that this is the distinctive basis of the catholic faith, just because it appears that it is common to us and to certain heretics as well. For if we think carefully about the meaning of Christ, we shall see that among some of the heretics who wish to be called Christians, the _name_ of Christ is held in honor, but the reality itself is not among them. To make all this plain would take too long -- because we would then have to review all the heresies that have been, the ones that now exist, and those which could exist under the label "Christian," and we would have to show that what we have said of all is true of each of them. Such a discussion would take so many volumes as to make it seem endless. (Already, very early in his ministry (397), Augustine had written De agone Christiano, in which he had reviewed and refuted a full score of heresies threatening the orthodox faith.)
6. You have asked for an enchiridion, something you could carry around, not just baggage for your bookshelf. Therefore we may return to these three ways in which, as we said, God should be served: faith, hope, love. It is easy to _say_ what one ought to believe, what to hope for, and what to love. But to defend our doctrines against the calumnies of those who think differently is a more difficult and detailed task. If one is to have this wisdom, it is not enough just to put an enchiridion in the hand. It is also necessary that a great zeal be kindled in the heart.
THE CREED AND THE LORD'S PRAYER AS GUIDES TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES OF FAITH, HOPE, AND LOVE
7. Let us begin, for example, with
the Symbol (The Apostles' Creed. Cf. Augustine's early essay On Faith and the
Creed.) and the Lord's Prayer. What is shorter to hear or to read? What is more
easily memorized? Since through sin the human race stood grievously burdened by
great misery and in deep need of mercy, a prophet, preaching of the time of
God's grace, said, "And it shall be that all who invoke the Lord's name
will be saved." (Joel 2:32.)
Thus, we have the Lord's Prayer. Later, the apostle, when he wished to commend
this same grace, remembered this prophetic testimony and promptly added,
"But how shall they invoke him in whom they have not believed?" (Rom. 10:14.)
Thus, we have the Symbol. In these two we have the three theological virtues
working together: faith believes; hope and love pray. Yet without faith nothing
else is possible; thus faith prays too. This, then, is the meaning of the
saying, "How shall they invoke him in whom they have not believed?"
8. Now, is it possible to hope for what we do not believe in? We can, of course, believe in something that we do not hope for. Who among the faithful does not believe in the punishment of the impious? Yet he does not hope for it, and whoever believes that such a punishment is threatening him and draws back in horror from it is more rightly said to fear than to hope. A poet, distinguishing between these two feelings, said,
"Let those who dread be allowed to hope," (Lucan, Pharsalia, II, 15.)
but another poet, and a better one, did not put it rightly:
"Here, if I could have hoped for [i.e., foreseen] such a grievous blow..." (Virgil, Aeneid, IV, 419. The context of this quotation is Dido's lament over Aeneas' prospective abandonment of her. She is saying that if she could have foreseen such a disaster, she would have been able to bear it. Augustine's criticism here is a literalistic quibble.)
Indeed, some grammarians use this
as an example of inaccurate language and comment, "He said 'to hope' when
he should have said 'to fear.'"
Therefore faith may refer to evil things as well as to good, since we believe in both the good and evil. Yet faith is good, not evil. Moreover, faith refers to things past and present and future. For we believe that Christ died; this is a past event. We believe that he sitteth at the Father's right hand; this is present. We believe that he will come as our judge; this is future. Again, faith has to do with our own affairs and with those of others. For everyone believes, both about himself and other persons -- and about things as well -- that at some time he began to exist and that he has not existed forever. Thus, not only about men, but even about angels, we believe many things that have a bearing on religion.
But hope deals only with good things, and only with those which lie in the future, and which pertain to the man who cherishes the hope. Since this is so, faith must be distinguished from hope: they are different terms and likewise different concepts. Yet faith and hope have this in common: they refer to what is not seen, whether this unseen is believed in or hoped for. Thus in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which is used by the enlightened defenders of the catholic rule of faith, faith is said to be "the conviction of things not seen." (Heb. 11:1.) However, when a man maintains that neither words nor witnesses nor even arguments, but only the evidence of present experience, determine his faith, he still ought not to be called absurd or told, "You have seen; therefore you have not believed." For it does not follow that unless a thing is not seen it cannot be believed. Still it is better for us to use the term "faith," as we are taught in "the sacred eloquence," (Sacra eloquia -- a favorite phrase of Augustine's for the Bible.) to refer to things not seen. And as for hope, the apostle says: "Hope that is seen is not hope. For if a man sees a thing, why does he hope for it? If, however, we hope for what we do not see, we then wait for it in patience." (Rom. 8:24, 25 (Old Latin).) When, therefore, our good is believed to be future, this is the same thing as hoping for it.
What, then, shall I say of love, without which faith can do nothing? There can be no true hope without love. Indeed, as the apostle James says, "Even the demons believe and tremble." (James 2:19.)
Yet they neither hope nor love. Instead, believing as we do that what we hope for and love is coming to pass, they tremble. Therefore, the apostle Paul approves and commends the faith that works by love and that cannot exist without hope. Thus it is that love is not without hope, hope is not without love, and neither hope nor love are without faith.
GOD THE CREATOR OF ALL; AND THE GOODNESS OF ALL CREATION
9. Wherefore, when it is asked what
we ought to believe in matters of religion, the answer is not to be sought in
the exploration of the nature of things [rerum natura], after the manner of
those whom the Greeks called "physicists." (One of the standard
titles of early Greek philosophical treatises would translate into Latin as De
rerum natura. This is, in fact, the title of Lucretius' famous poem, the
greatest philosophical work written in classical Latin.) Nor should we be
dismayed if Christians are ignorant about the properties and the number of the
basic elements of nature, or about the motion, order, and deviations of the
stars, the map of the heavens, the kinds and nature of animals, plants, stones,
springs, rivers, and mountains; about the divisions of space and time, about
the signs of impending storms, and the myriad other things which these
"physicists" have come to understand, or think they have. For even
these men, gifted with such superior insight, with their ardor in study and
their abundant leisure, exploring some of these matters by human conjecture and
others through historical inquiry, have not yet learned everything there is to
know. For that matter, many of the things they are so proud to have discovered
are more often matters of opinion than of verified knowledge.
For the Christian, it is enough to believe that the cause of all created things, whether in heaven or on earth, whether visible or invisible, is nothing other than the goodness of the Creator, who is the one and the true God. (This basic motif appears everywhere in Augustine's thought as the very foundation of his whole system.) Further, the Christian believes that nothing exists save God himself and what comes from him; and he believes that God is triune, i.e., the Father, and the Son begotten of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeding from the same Father, but one and the same Spirit of the Father and the Son.
10. By this Trinity, supremely and equally and immutably good, were all things created. But they were not created supremely, equally, nor immutably good. Still, each single created thing is good, and taken as a whole they are very good, because together they constitute a universe of admirable beauty.
11. In this universe, even what is called evil, when it is rightly ordered and kept in its place, commends the good more eminently, since good things yield greater pleasure and praise when compared to the bad things. For the Omnipotent God, whom even the heathen acknowledge as the Supreme Power over all, would not allow any evil in his works, unless in his omnipotence and goodness, as the Supreme Good, he is able to bring forth good out of evil. What, after all, is anything we call evil except the privation of good? In animal bodies, for instance, sickness and wounds are nothing but the privation of health. When a cure is effected, the evils which were present (i.e., the sickness and the wounds) do not retreat and go elsewhere. Rather, they simply do not exist any more. For such evil is not a substance; the wound or the disease is a defect of the bodily substance which, as a substance, is good. Evil, then, is an accident, i.e., a privation of that good which is called health. Thus, whatever defects there are in a soul are privations of a natural good. When a cure takes place, they are not transferred elsewhere but, since they are no longer present in the state of health, they no longer exist at all. (This section (Chs. III and IV) is the most explicit statement of a major motif which pervades the whole of Augustinian metaphysics. We see it in his earliest writings, Soliloquies, 1, 2, and De ordine, II, 7. It is obviously a part of the Neoplatonic heritage which Augustine appropriated for his Christian philosophy. The good is positive, constructive, essential; evil is privative, destructive, parasitic on the good. It has its origin, not in nature, but in the will. Cf. Confessions, Bk. VII, Chs. III, V, XII-XVI; On Continence, 14-16; On the Gospel of John, Tractate XCVIII, 7; City of God, XI, 17; XII, 7-9.)
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
12. All of nature, therefore, is
good, since the Creator of all nature is supremely good. But nature is not
supremely and immutably good as is the Creator of it. Thus the good in created
things can be diminished and augmented. For good to be diminished is evil;
still, however much it is diminished, something must remain of its original
nature as long as it exists at all. For no matter what kind or however
insignificant a thing may be, the good which is its "nature" cannot
be destroyed without the thing itself being destroyed. There is good reason,
therefore, to praise an uncorrupted thing, and if it were indeed an
incorruptible thing which could not be destroyed, it would doubtless be all the
more worthy of praise. When, however, a thing is corrupted, its corruption is
an evil because it is, by just so much, a privation of the good. Where there is
no privation of the good, there is no evil. Where there is evil, there is a
corresponding diminution of the good. As long, then, as a thing is being
corrupted, there is good in it of which it is being deprived; and in this
process, if something of its being remains that cannot be further corrupted,
this will then be an incorruptible entity [natura incorruptibilis], and to this
great good it will have come through the process of corruption. But even if the
corruption is not arrested, it still does not cease having some good of which
it cannot be further deprived. If, however, the corruption comes to be total
and entire, there is no good left either, because it is no longer an entity at
all. Wherefore corruption cannot consume the good without also consuming the
thing itself. Every actual entity [natura] is therefore good; a greater good if
it cannot be corrupted, a lesser good if it can be. Yet only the foolish and
unknowing can deny that it is still good even when corrupted. Whenever a thing
is consumed by corruption, not even the corruption remains, for it is nothing
in itself, having no subsistent being in which to exist.
13. From this it follows that there is nothing to be called evil if there is nothing good. A good that wholly lacks an evil aspect is entirely good. Where there is some evil in a thing, its good is defective or defectible. Thus there can be no evil where there is no good. This leads us to a surprising conclusion: that, since every being, in so far as it is a being, is good, if we then say that a defective thing is bad, it would seem to mean that we are saying that what is evil is good, that only what is good is ever evil and that there is no evil apart from something good. This is because every actual entity is good [omnis natura bonum est]. Nothing evil exists _in itself_, but only as an evil aspect of some actual entity. Therefore, there can be nothing evil except something good. Absurd as this sounds, nevertheless the logical connections of the argument compel us to it as inevitable. At the same time, we must take warning lest we incur the prophetic judgment which reads: "Woe to those who call evil good and good evil: who call darkness light and light darkness; who call the bitter sweet and the sweet bitter." (Isa. 5:20.) Moreover the Lord himself saith: "An evil man brings forth evil out of the evil treasure of his heart." (Matt. 12:35.) What, then, is an evil man but an evil entity [natura mala], since man is an entity? Now, if a man is something good because he is an entity, what, then, is a bad man except an evil good? When, however, we distinguish between these two concepts, we find that the bad man is not bad because he is a man, nor is he good because he is wicked. Rather, he is a good entity in so far as he is a man, evil in so far as he is wicked. Therefore, if anyone says that simply to be a man is evil, or that to be a wicked man is good, he rightly falls under the prophetic judgment: "Woe to him who calls evil good and good evil." For this amounts to finding fault with God's work, because man is an entity of God's creation. It also means that we are praising the defects in this particular man _because_ he is a wicked person. Thus, every entity, even if it is a defective one, in so far as it is an entity, is good. In so far as it is defective, it is evil.
14. Actually, then, in these two contraries we call evil and good, the rule of the logicians fails to apply. (This refers to Aristotle's well-known principle of "the excluded middle.") No weather is both dark and bright at the same time; no food or drink is both sweet and sour at the same time; no body is, at the same time and place, both white and black, nor deformed and well-formed at the same time. This principle is found to apply in almost all disjunctions: two contraries cannot coexist in a single thing. Nevertheless, while no one maintains that good and evil are not contraries, they can not only coexist, but the evil cannot exist at all without the good, or in a thing that is not a good. On the other hand, the good can exist without evil. For a man or an angel could exist and yet not be wicked, whereas there cannot be wickedness except in a man or an angel. It is good to be a man, good to be an angel; but evil to be wicked. These two contraries are thus coexistent, so that if there were no good in what is evil, then the evil simply could not be, since it can have no mode in which to exist, nor any source from which corruption springs, unless it be something corruptible. Unless this something is good, it cannot be corrupted, because corruption is nothing more than the deprivation of the good. Evils, therefore, have their source in the good, and unless they are parasitic on something good, they are not anything at all. There is no other source whence an evil thing can come to be. If this is the case, then, in so far as a thing is an entity, it is unquestionably good. If it is an incorruptible entity, it is a great good. But even if it is a corruptible entity, it still has no mode of existence except as an aspect of something that is good. Only by corrupting something good can corruption inflict injury.
15. But when we say that evil has its source in the good, do not suppose that this denies our Lord's judgment: "A good tree cannot bear evil fruit." (Matt. 7:18.) This cannot be, even as the Truth himself declareth: "Men do not gather grapes from thorns," since thorns cannot bear grapes. Nevertheless, from good soil we can see both vines and thorns spring up. Likewise, just as a bad tree does not grow good fruit, so also an evil will does not produce good deeds. From a human nature, which is good in itself, there can spring forth either a good or an evil will. There was no other place from whence evil could have arisen in the first place except from the nature -- good in itself -- of an angel or a man. This is what our Lord himself most clearly shows in the passage about the trees and the fruits, for he said: "Make the tree good and the fruits will be good, or make the tree bad and its fruits will be bad." (Cf. Matt. 12:33.) This is warning enough that bad fruit cannot grow on a good tree nor good fruit on a bad one. Yet from that same earth to which he was referring, both sorts of trees can grow.
—Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love